Institutional reforms versus selective targeting? Comments on the draft law `On state support of investment and encouraging investment activity' drafted by the Ministry of Economy by Richard Frensch & Natalie Leschenko
   
                                                     





Telefon: 089/99 83 96-0 
Telefax: 089/98 10 110 
E-Mail: oei@oei-muenchen.de
 Internet: www.oei-muenchen.de 
Kurzanalysen und 
Informationen 
Nr. 19  Juni 2004	  Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Abteilung 
Institutional reforms versus selective targeting? 
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encouraging investment activity” drafted by the Ministry of Economy
1 
Richard FRENSCH, Natalie LESCHENKO 
Summary and policy recommendations 
Elements of the institutional framework, i.e., the rules and regulations of the economy and the institu­
tions   that enforce them, are the main long-run criteria for private investment decisions. In particular, it 
is openness to trade and transparency that increase the chances   of   enhancing domestic   investment 
and increasing FDI. Against the background of Ukraine’s still rather poor institutional framework, spe­
cifically targeted investment incentives for pre-defined sectors, regions, and/or types   of   investment, 
can be both costly and ineffective. Leaning towards selective targeting, the draft law   does   not suffi­
ciently serve to sustainably enhance private investment in the long run. 
We recommend to consistently re-draft the law to represent Ukraine’s Guidelines for Public Support 
of Private Investment, in line with private investor preferences and international experience. Compared 
to the first draft, we specifically suggest: 
•  	  to focus   on improvements of the institutional framework and eliminate all specific targeting ele­
ments from the law; 
•  	  to eliminate all references to public investment from this draft law, which should concentrate on 
public support for private domestic and foreign investment; 
•  	  not to revert to state aid in order to support private investment activity; 
•  	  to expand the final provisions of the draft law   and explicitly mention supplementary legislation nec­
essary to improve the institutional framework for investment in Ukraine. In particular, we recom­
mend to focus on the adjustment of the tax legislation according to international standards, em­
ployment standards, and provisions that define property rights,   to improve law   enforcement, the 
transparency of the public sector, and the efficiency of public spending by cutting state aid. This 
would serve to demonstrate that institutional framework reforms need a broad and concerted effort 
from all sources of legislative action. 
1 Originally published as Policy Paper T30, German Advisory Group / Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting, 
Kyiv, April 2004. 
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1. The background 
In consequence of the recent increase in in­
vestment demand, Ukraine’s share of   fixed 
capital formation in GDP was   both in 2002 and 
2003 around 20%, which is within reasonable 
limits for a transition economy.   Understandably, 
policy   makers in the country are concerned with 
the long-run sustainability   of high rates of in­
vestment. 
The investment activity in Ukraine is regulated 
and influenced by numerous laws, international 
treaties,   bilateral agreements, and other legisla­
tive documents.   However, so far there has been 
no consistent policy towards private domestic 
investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The draft law “On state support of investment and 
encouraging investment activity” attempts   to fill 
the gap. It was drafted within MoEEI, partly in 
response to the Presidential Act #580 “On addi­
tional measures   for FDI attraction in Ukraine” of 7 
July, 2003, which required to draft a Law   that 
should especially: 
1. 	define the priorities for investment activities 
to receive state support and the mecha­
nisms to encourage investment attraction; 
strengthen investors’ rights; 
2. 	simplify the registration of   foreign investors, 
the procedure of investment project imple­
mentation, and product licensing. 
The first requirement calls for a law that gives 
specific support to FDI versus domestic invest­
ment and to investment in pre-defined priority 
sectors and regions. The second requirement 
demands provisions to improve the business 
environment, or   institutional framework,   for in­
vestment. The next section will show that these 
two requirements in fact represent two very   dif­
ferent approaches to investment support. 
While the draft law indeed tries to address 
both approaches, we recommend to improve all 
aspects of the institutional framework   for   private 
investment in Ukraine rather than apply selective 
targeted policies, which are not to yield any 
benefits on their own within an insufficiently   de-
veloped institutional framework.   Especially, we 
recommend against discrimination by type of 
investment under any circumstances and cannot 
recommend the use of incentives   targeted at 
specific   sectors or regions without prior substan-
tial institutional framework reforms. 
Whereas the Presidential Act #580 calls   ex­
plicitly   for measures to attract FDI to Ukraine, the 
MoEEI draft law nowhere limits itself to this   topic, 
but rather aims at streamlining all the scattered 
legislation into providing general guidelines and 
instruments for public support of all types   of   in­
vestment in Ukraine. The first draft (see Appendix 
A), which is the basis of this comment, was for­
warded to the Cabinet of Ministers (CMU). CMU 
comments on the first draft are summarized in 
Appendix B. 
2. Alternatives to support private invest-
ment 
The growth impulses from   private investment, 
and from FDI in particular, are commonly   recog­
nized by   economists   and policy makers. In fact 
they   form   the small core of empirically safe­
guarded knowledge on growth: while many   other 
results   are fragile, one can identify a positive, 
robust correlation between growth and the share 
of investment in GDP.
2 Specifically, a recent 
OECD study concludes that FDI supports   growth 
in developing, emerging and transition econo­
mies, irrespective of   their initial state of develop­
ment.
3
However,   these benefits do not come about 
automatically   but need public policy support. Pub­
lic   policy to further private investment may in 
principle follow   two different patterns, a selective 
targeting  versus an institutional framework   ap­
proach: 
•  	  Public policy towards private domestic   in­
vestment and FDI may be based on specific 
support  for pre-defined priority sectors, re­
gions, and/or   types of investment. This policy 
appears   to be the advocated in the Presiden­
tial Decree as well as in the CMU comments 
on the first draft of the law (see Appendix B). 
•  	  Public policy towards private investment may 
concentrate on providing a good business 
environment, or   institutional framework,   for 
investment. This is the policy advocated by 
international organizations as well as in this 
paper. 
2.1. Selective targeting 
Targeted policies involve offering incentives (tax 
reductions and other   fiscal concessions, cash 
grants and loans, start-up assistance to investors, 
etc.)   either   generally   or to attract prioritized in­
vestment projects. These incentives may be suit­
able when they are non-discriminatory (i.e. offer 
similar incentives to similar   investors,   whether 
domestic or foreign) and correct weaknesses   in 
the domestic   environment that cannot otherwise 
be addressed. Also, where authorities   aim   to 
jump-start economic activity in a given sector, 
investment incentives have sometimes proved 
                                                     
2 http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/aer92lr.htm 
3 OECD,   Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maxi-
mising Benefits, Minimising Costs, Paris, 2002. 
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Institutional reforms versus selective targeting 
instrumental in attracting a critical mass of rele­
vant enterprises. The experiences of recent dec­
ades in both OECD countries and developing 
economies, notably in South East Asia, seem to 
include several apparent success stories. 
However, the use of such instruments repre­
sents a risky strategy. Deciding how much to sub­
sidize which investment projects, and by means of 
which instruments, involves difficult political and 
economic choices. Authorities are at the risk of 
finding themselves over-subsidizing projects or 
creating unintended economic disturbances if they 
get “picking the winners” wrong. At the more prac­
tical level, many authorities lack the data and ex­
pertise required by incentive programs, which are 
resource intensive to finance and to manage. Most 
incentives are administratively burdensome. 
A final caveat relates to the value of incentives 
to investors. It is one thing for governments to 
share the risk of an investment, but the invest­
ment has to make sense without the support of 
public funds. In fact, many incentives are of little 
relevance to the investors being targeted, despite 
the possible costs to the implementing authority. 
As an example, investment in research and de­
velopment requires a functioning patent protec­
tion to secure long-term benefits. In the absence 
of such an effective legal protection, direct sub­
sidization is a very costly and ineffective substi­
tute. As another example, imagine a tax cut for 
FDI in an otherwise corrupt environment. In­
creasing future net profits might land in the pock­
ets of a bureaucrat with regulatory power, which 
is to show that targeted policies are not sufficient 
to induce investment. 
Box 1: Legal limits to state support for foreign direct investment 
State investment policy measures are a topic for EU and WTO discussions due to their   impact on 
competition and trade. With the exception of the OECD Investment Declaration (1976),
4 countries have 
failed to reach agreements on FDI attraction policies. Measures that prohibit, limit, or moderate incen­
tives to attract FDI are found in the following documents. 
(1) the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
   1.  Subsidies that require the recipient to meet certain export targets   or   to use domestic   goods   in­
stead of imported goods are prohibited. 
   2.  Subsidies   are limited if   a complaining country shows that they have an adverse effect on its in­
terests.
5 
(2) the WTO Agreement on TRIM   that prohibits certain trade-related investment measures.
6 
(3) the State Aid Provisions of the EU   ban support that may distort competition and are the only 
agreement imposing disciplining devices. 
References to competition-distorting measures are contained in Article 87 of   the EC Treaty.   Article 89 
provides the Commission with the power   to define aid compatibility   with the Treaty.   In particular,   state 
aid provisions   are subject to principles of   laissez faire, adequate institutions, accountability, transpar-
ency, and limited continuity and scope.
7 
However, few international disputes have ever challenged an FDI incentive program. 
8 
4 http://www.oecd.org/document/53/0,2340,en_2649_34887_1933109_1_1_1_1,00.html 
5 Fadzil, Mohamed, “Antidumping and countervailing duties: a postscript to the 1995 WTO Law.” Available online at 
www.mlj.com.mu/free/articles/rozlinda&maharom.htm
6 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003, Chapter 3:  FDI Policies for Development. National and International Perspectives, 
United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2003. 
7 For details see IER/GAG, “Comment on the draft law ‘On state aid’ ”, Policy Paper A10-2003, Kyiv, October 2003. 







                                                     
 
   
 
 













                                                     
4.1. Objectives 
The explicit objective of this law   should be to 
support private investment in Ukraine. However, 
Article 4 of   the draft law states the objectives of 
state investment support in terms of both the 
institutional framework and the selective targeting 
approach, as “increasing the volumes of invest­
ments,   concentrating investments in spheres that 
are of high priority   for   economic   development, 
creating a favourable investment environment.” 
 
OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT MÜNCHEN 
2.2. The institutional framework for private 
investment 
Since it concentrates on a narrow range of the 
economy,   the specific targeting strategy for pri­
vate domestic investment support or FDI attrac­
tion is   limited in its benefits, which in the absence 
of a good overall business environment may not 
even be realized. 
Policies, which create a level playing field for 
all types of private investment thus matter more. 
As evidence from many   countries   shows,
9 the 
provision of an institutional framework   of an 
economy,   i.e. the rules and regulations and the 
institutions that enforce them, is   the most   impor­
tant long-run factor to influence investment deci­
sions. Accordingly,   national governments are well 
advised to focus their efforts   at enhancing do­
mestic investment and at attracting FDI largely   on 
improving the institutional framework,   comprising 
such   public   goods such as economic stability, the 
rule of   law, and transparency. In a good institu­
tional framework, 
•  	  institutions and laws favour   production over 
rent-seeking activities; 
•  	  the economy is open to international trade 
and competition in the global marketplace; 
and 
•  	  the economic institutions are stable. 
In particular, it is openness to trade and trans­
parency   that increase the chances of enhancing 
domestic investment and increasing FDI in the 
long run. In terms of transparency, investors are 
in general very sensitive to the respect of the law, 
the quality   of public and private governance, the 
pervasiveness of corrupt practices, and the de­
gree to which authorities adhere to the principle 
of non-discrimination. 
9 According to an OECD survey, Checklist for Foreign Direct 
Investment Incentive Policies, Paris 2003. Available online at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/21/2506900.pdf; Singapore 
considers skill creation, institution building and infrastructure 
development an integral part of its FDI attraction strategy. 
Trade liberalisation is part of China’s FDI policies. United 
Nations, Investment and Technology Policies for Competiti-
veness: Review of Successful Country Experiences, New 
York and Geneva, 2003. 
3. The current status of the institutional 
framework for private investment in 
Ukraine 
In spite of the long-run predominance of elements 
of the institutional framework in shaping private 
investor decisions, public policy in Ukraine has so 
far not succeeded to establish a good institutional 
framework for private investment. 
Ukraine is a very open economy in terms of 
export and import to GDP ratios of above 55%, 
respectively. A recently signed agreement to join 
a Single Economic Space with Belarus, Ka­
zakhstan and Russia, however, has questioned 
the government’s commitment to free trade and 
openness, as this agreement challenges the 
Ukraine’s completing negotiations on a WTO 
accession.
10 
Appendix C presents public governance indi­
cators that, besides openness, shape the most 
important aspects of the institutional framework 
for investment. According to the charts, in five out 
of six indicators Ukraine scores extremely low, in 
the bottom quarter of all the world’s countries. 
Given these shortcomings, if the Ukrainian gov­
ernment were to offer targeted investment incen­
tives within this existing institutional framework, 
such a policy would constitute a costly and inef­
fective state activity to compensate for state fail­
ure. 
We recommend to improve all aspects of the 
institutional framework for private investment in 
Ukraine rather than apply selective targeted poli-
cies, which are not to yield any benefits on their 
own within an insufficiently developed institutional 
framework. In order to increase the credibility of 
its commitment to openness to international trade 
and competition in the global marketplace, the 
government should concentrate on WTO acces-
sion rather than regional re-integration. 
10 IER/GAG, “Which priority for Ukraine’s trade policy? ‘Sin­
gle economic space’ (SES) vs. World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)”, Policy Paper T14, Kyiv, October 2003. 
4. Does the draft law contribute to sup-
port private investment in Ukraine? 
Objectives, objects and instruments of the law 
should support private investment in Ukraine by 
contributing to a better institutional framework. 
Leaning towards selective targeting, however, the 
first version of the draft law does not serve to 





   
 




   















                                                     
   
 












                                                     
Institutional reforms versus selective targeting 
We recommend to state “creating a favourable 
institutional framework for private investment” as 
the sole objective of the law. 
4.2. Objects 
Within the institutional framework reforms ap­
proach, all private investment should be the ob­
ject of this law. Although a complete list of priority 
sectors is not specified, Article 5 of the draft law 
explicitly refers to selective targeting of invest­
ment support: “State investment support is 
granted to separate sectors of the economy, 
separate administrative and territorial units ac­
cording to the priorities of economic and social 
development stated by the State Program of 
Economic and Social Development of Ukraine, 
state targeted programs, programs of economic 
and social development of the Autonomous Re­
public of Crimea, oblasts, rayons, and cities.” 
This preference for a selective targeting ap­
proach conflicts with the substantial shortcomings 
in Ukraine’s institutional framework for private 
investment identified above, such that this ap­
proach can hardly be effective. 
We therefore recommend to explicitly state the 
principle of non-discrimination between types of 
investment. 
The list of types of public support of invest­
ment activities (Article 6, Appendix A) includes 
public investment. However, investment in public 
goods, which is the domain of public investment, 
by definition follows very different purposes, crite­
ria and decision rules than private investment. 
Public investment, like all public expenditure, 
requires a market failure argument based on that 
social rates of return on such expenditures differ 
considerably from private returns. E.g., to con­
tinue the example from above, even effective 
patent protection may give too little incentive to 
privately invest enough in basic research and 
development, due to knowledge spillovers. How­
ever, there is a clear-cut need to differentiate the 
topics of justifying public investment, the involve­
ment of private investment in the provision of 
public goods, and the efficiency of both from the 
topic of public support for private investment. 
We recommend to eliminate all references to 
public investment from this draft law, which 
should concentrate on public support for private 
domestic investment and FDI. We recommend to 
completely relegate public investment issues to 
supplementary legislation that should also in-
cludes additional considerations such as, 
11 the 
limits of useful state intervention; the clear defini-
11 We commented on these issues in IER/GAG, “How to 
improve public investment efficiency in Ukraine?”, Policy 
Paper T22, Kyiv, February 2004. 
tion of and transparent procedures for public in-
vestment project selection; clear and explicit for-
mulae on granting intergovernmental capital 
transfers to local budgets.
12 
4.3. Instruments 
To match the institutional reforms approach, in­
struments of private investment support should 
be compatible with the seven OECD Guiding 
Principles for Policies Toward Attracting FDI,
13 
bearing in mind that these principles are applica­
ble to domestic private investment as well. 
1. Safeguarding public	  sector transparency,   in-
cluding an impartial system of courts and law 
enforcement 
While the draft law does not address this princi­
ple, item 9 of Article 7 (Appendix A), however, 
refers to procedural transparency improvements 
that should favour the reduction of corruption, red 
tape and reduce the administrative costs of busi­
ness. 
We suggest to include an explicit requirement 
to make all information relevant for investment 
decisions publicly available.
14 
2. Ensuring that rules and their implementation 
rest   on the principle of non-discrimination be-
tween foreign and domestic enterprises and 
are in accordance with international law 
Article 7 of the draft law nowhere explicitly differ­
entiates types of investors. But the reference to 
“free economic zones” in item 8 of article 7 may 
be understood in terms of potential attempts to 
give special investment incentives to FDI. How­
ever, in the institutional framework approach for 
investment, attractive terms to investors should 
be part of the overall industrial policy and be 
equally available to all foreign and domestic in­
vestors. Incentives should follow the same logic 
and focus on activities with the strongest potential 
for spillovers, including linkages between foreign 
and domestic firms, education, training and R&D. 
12 The MinFin draft law “On the Basics   of   Granting Subsidies 
from   the State Budget of Ukraine to Implement Investment 
Projects” has neither been re-drafted nor enacted for about   a 
year. 
13 OECD,   Checklist for Foreign Direct Investment Incentive 
Policies, Paris, 2003. 
14 Most common exceptions from transparency are to   protect 
confidential   information for commercial interests, national 
security, public order, and the pursuit of monetary and ex­
change rate policies. OECD,   Framework for Investment 
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We recommend to explicitly state the principle 
of non-discrimination. We also recommend to 
more clearly state the mechanism of implement-
ing the provisions in items 1, 3, 5, and 8 of article 
7 to guarantee non-discrimination by type of in-
vestment, taking into account the legal limits to 
state support of investment as stated in Box 1.
15 
3.  Providing the right for free transfers   related to 
and protecting against arbitrary expropriation 
The law does not explicitly contribute to this prin­
ciple.
16 Concerning other investors’ rights, these 
should first of all be addressed by provisions 
favouring non-discrimination of foreign investors 
in land ownership,
17 and protecting the rights of 
small investors that in turn should create more 
possibilities for enterprises to diversify. The draft 
law also does not suggest simplifying the regis­
tration of foreign investors. 
We recommend to expand the final provisions 
of the draft law and explicitly mention supple-
mentary legislation necessary to improve the 
institutional framework for investment in Ukraine. 
4. Putting in place adequate frameworks	  for a 
healthy competitive environment in the do-
mestic business sector 
The draft law does not correspond well to this 
fundamental principle. Article 6 refers to selective 
targeting and priority setting following the Pro­
gram of Economic and Social Development. The 
suggested instruments are, however, outright 
state aid via state guarantees and public subsidi­
zation of interest cost.
18 State aid provisions are 
implicitly referred to again in the “special regimes” 
of item 8 of Article 7. 
We recommend not to revert to practices that 
are either state aid to private investment and/or 
discriminatory. Together with the comment in 
section 4.2, this amounts to our recommending to 
drop Article 6 of the draft law altogether. 
15 In this respect, the draft law should be also supplemented 
by additional legislative acts such as a Law on State Aid. For 
details see IER/GAG, “Comment on the draft law ‘On state 
aid’, Policy Paper A10-2003, Kyiv, October, 2003. 
16 The Law of Ukraine #1540a-XII on Protecting Foreign 
Investments contains clear guidelines in this respect con­
sistent with international practice. 
17 Several empirical studies suggest a strong positive corre­
lation between land ownership rights and FDI, for example 
see Besley, T., “Property rights and investment incentives: 
theory and evidence from Ghana,” The Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 103, No. 5, 1995, pp. 903–937. 
18 This is not consistent with international guidelines (Box 1). 
In particular, EU rules restrict the use of granting loan gua­
rantees, co-financing, and interest subsidisation. Cf. 
IER/GAG, “Comment on the draft law ‘On state aid’, Policy 
Paper A10-2003, Kyiv, October, 2003. 
Items 4 – 7 and 9 of article 7 have the poten­
tial to improve the domestic investment infra­
structure and to reduce administrative costs if 
applied without discrimination by types of invest­
ment. 
However, provisions could be more clearly 
stated not to leave room for interpretation in fa-
vour of targeted strategies. Provisions should be 
supplemented by additional legislative action, e.g. 
the creation of a state registry of immovable 
property. 
5. Removing obstacles to international trade 
The draft law does not explicitly address interna­
tional trade. However, items 6 and 9 of article 7 
envisage the improvement of the licensing and 
standards system. 
We recommend international standards to be 
taken into account in order to avoid wasteful 
practices for FDI competition. 
6. Redress those aspects of the tax system that 
constitute barriers to FDI 
Properly implemented, items 1 and 3 of article 7 
can serve towards improving the institutional 
framework for investment. 
Provisions should, however, be re-drafted to 
foresee the elimination of double-accounting pro-
cedures that increase the administrative costs of 
business to move closer to international taxation 
requirements and to ensure equal treatment of 
taxpayers.
19 
Additional legislative action requires that de­
preciation policies be oriented at best practice 
accounting rules in order to avoid distorting the 
firms’ production decisions. In relation to the for­
eign investors, the government should follow the 
provisions of bilateral agreements that ensure the 
avoidance of double-taxation. 
7. Ensuring that public spending is adequate and 
relevant 
Item 2 of article 7 on the support of commercial 
banks’ liquidity can be read as potentially favour­
ing quasi-fiscal activities. 
We recommend to exclude this provision from 
the draft law. 
19  Although the principle of equal treatment of taxpayers is 
stated in the Law on the System of Taxation, it is not fulfilled 
in practice: IER, Openness and Transparency of Public 




















   
                                                     
 




Institutional reforms versus selective targeting 
4.4. SME policies 
While the share of employment in small enter­
prises is now between 45% and 55% in most of 
the Eastern European economies, where small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) are considered 
to be one of the engines of growth, the respective 
share in Ukraine has not yet reached 20 per cent 
of the total.
20  Barriers to SME entry have so far 
been connected to the low level of the institutional 
framework, mainly the tax system, unequal 
treatment, corruption, over-regulation, underde­
veloped financial services markets and property 
rights protection.
21 
Our guiding principle towards policies to sup­
port private investment is the creation of a good 
institutional framework, removing incentives that 
distort competition. However, as stated above, 
non-discriminatory targeted investment incentives 
may be suitable when they correct weaknesses in 
the domestic environment that cannot otherwise 
be addressed. Such imperfection may exist in the 
limited access of SMEs to the capital market, 
costly access to information, and relatively high 
administrative costs. 
In order to create a level playing field here, Ar­
ticle 8 of the draft law foresees vital but not really 
specific policies to enhance SME investment 
activity. 
We agree with these provisions unless they 
imply direct support from public budgets. How-
ever, this should not remain the only type of SME 
support, but needs to be complemented with 
easing the entry and exit of enterprises, ease of 
information and tax administration.
22 
5. Conclusions and policy recommenda-
tions 
Elements of the institutional framework are the 
major criteria for domestic and foreign private 
investment decisions. In case of a poor institu­
tional framework, as is still the case with Ukraine, 
20  Economic Survey of Europe, 2003, No. 1, Chapter 5: 
Progress in Systemic Reforms in the CIS, Economic Com­
mission for Europe, United Nations, Geneva. 
21 IFC, Ukrainian Enterprises in the Year 2000, Kyiv, 2001. 
No more recent update available.
 
22 For more details see IER/GAG, Development of Domestic
 




the provision of targeted selective investment 
incentives can constitute a costly and ineffective 
state activity to correct for state failure. Specifi­
cally, the use of investment incentives focusing 
on foreign firms is not recommendable, as   spill­
overs   of   technology and human capital do not 
follow automatically from foreign direct   invest­
ment. Attractive terms to all investors   should be 
seen as   part of a country’s overall industrial pol­
icy. In its current form of leaning towards selec­
tive targeting, the draft law serves little to sus­
tainably enhance private investment activity. 
We recommend to consistently   re-draft   the 
law to represent Ukraine’s   Guidelines for Public 
Support of Private Investment, in line with private 
investor preferences and international experi­
ence. Compared to the current draft, we specifi­
cally suggest: 
•  	  to focus on improvements of the institutional 
framework and eliminate all specific   targeting 
elements from the law; 
•  	  to eliminate all references to public invest­
ment from this draft law, which should con­
centrate on public support for   private domes­
tic and foreign investment; 
•  	  not to revert   to state aid in order to support 
private investment activity; 
•  	  to expand the final provisions of the draft law 
and explicitly mention supplementary legisla­
tion necessary to improve the institutional 
framework for investment in Ukraine. In par­
ticular,   we recommend to focus on the ad­
justment of the tax legislation according to 
international standards, employment stan­
dards, and provisions that define property 
rights,   to improve law enforcement, the 
transparency   of   the public sector, and the ef­
ficiency   of   public spending by cutting state 
aid. This would serve to demonstrate that in­
stitutional framework   reforms need a broad 










Appendix A. Selected articles of the Draft Law 
Article 6. Types of state support to investment activity 
1.  Intergovernmental transfers to implement investment projects; 
2.	 Partial or   full compensation of interest   payments   on loans granted by commercial banks and other 
financial-and-credit institutions; 
3.	 Providing state guarantees for loans granted by international financial organizations or under   condi-
tions of co-financing (simultaneously with state support to investment activity); 
4.  Allocation of state capital investments to develop the infrastructure. 
Article 7. State measures to stimulate investment activity 
1.  Reform of the tax system in order to decrease the tax burden and to improve tax administration; 
2.	 Creation of conditions to increase the rate of concentration of bank capital, to increase the amount 
of long-term credits, and to support the liquidity of commercial banks that provide long-term loans to 
investment projects; 
3. Reform of depreciation deduction rules, increasing its role in the accelerated renovation of fixed 
assets; 
4.  Improvement of the management of corporate rights; 
5. Enhancement of the development of investment insurance, creation of non-bank financial institu­
tions; 
6.  Improvement of the system of licensing, tariff regulation, certification and standardization; 
7.  Support the signing of agreements on product assessment, concessions, leasing; 
8.  Creation of special (free) economic zones; introduction of a special regime of investment activities 
in technology parks, in territories of priority development, in depressive regions; formation of tax, 
exchange-rate, and customs regime; 
9.  Simplification of the procedure of obtaining permissions (i.e., licenses etc.); 
10.Organisation of and providing state training for specialists on investment activity. 
Article 8. Particularities of enhancing the investment activity of SMEs 
The state enhances the investment activity of SME according to the following directions: 
1. Favoring the involvement of the SMEs in the programs of economic   and social development of 
Ukraine, Crimea, oblasts, rayons, and cities; 
2.  Creation of conditions for development of micro-credits to SMEs; 
3.  Support for provision of informational and consultation services in investment activity; 
Appendix B: Comments of the Cabinet of Ministers on the first draft 
The comments   call for correspondence with the Presidential Act #580. According to the Act, the draft 
law should include clear statements on: 
1. 	a clear definition of high priority areas; 
2. 	a clear definition of types of state support; 
3.  Mechanisms to regulate the attraction of investments; 
4.  Stronger respect for the rights of investors. 
Note: CMU comments were communicated via the MoEEI. 
Kurzanalysen 
und Informationen 
8 Appendix C: Percentile ranks of governance indicators, 2002. 
Ukraine versus regional averages 
Political stability 
OE CD 




La tin America  & Ca rib b ea n 
UKR AINE
 
  Middle East & NorthAfrica 
S ubs aharan Africa
 
Sou th  As  ia
 
F ormer S ovi   et Union
 
0  2 0  4 0  6 0  8 0  1 0 0 





Ea ste rn Europ e 
  Middle East & NorthAfrica
 
S ubs aharan Africa 
Sou th  Asia
 




  F ormer S oviet Union 
0  2 0  4 0  6 0  8 0  1 0 0 
Rule of law 
OE CD 




La tin America  & Ca rib b ea n 
  Middle East & NorthAfrica 
Sou th  As  ia
 




F ormer S ovi   et Union
 




Ea s  te rn Europ e
 
La tin America  & Ca rib b ea n 
Ea st Asia 
M   iddle East & NorthAfrica
 
Sou th  As  ia
 




F ormer S ovi   et Union 
0  2 0  4 0  6 0  8 0  1 0 0 
Control for corruption 
OE CD 
Ea s  te rn Europ e
 
La tin America  & Ca rib b ea n 
  Middle East & NorthAfrica 
Ea st Asia
 
Sou th  As  ia
 




F ormer S ovi   et Union
 




Ea st Asia 
Ea s  te rn Europ e 
  Middle East & NorthAfrica
 
La tin America  & Ca rib b ea n
 
Sou th  As  ia
 




F ormer S ovi   et Union 
0  2 0  4 0  6 0  8 0  1 0 0 




   
     
     




Source: D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, “Governance matters III: governance indicators for 1996-2002”, World
 
Bank, draft, 2003. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3_other.html
 




Political stability reflects the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitu­
tional and/or violent means.
 
Voice and accountability covers various aspects of civil liberties and political rights, measuring the extent to which citizens of a
 
country are able to participate in the political process.
 




Government effectiveness describes the credibility of government policies, incorporating the quality of public service provision,
 
the quality of bureaucracy, the proficiency of general government employees and their political independence.
 
Control for corruption reflects a perception of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain.
 
Regulatory quality aggregates subjective responses of the investors on government regulation, e.g. excess regulation in foreign
 
trade and business development.
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